Q&A with former South Vietnamese ambassador Bui Diem

Bui Diem was South Vietnam's last ambassador to the United States. Since 1975, he has lived in the United States.

Q: What do you think of the relationship today between the United States and Vietnam, and what do you expect it will be in the future?

A: In terms of the relations between state and state, it’s a kind of normalization, beginning in 1995. But not yet in terms of strategic relations; it is difficult for a democracy like the U.S. to get along with a communist regime in Hanoi. It is not yet the kind of close relations in terms of strategic relations. Relations between two people, that is another part of it. More than one million Vietnamese are here, enjoying a free society; whether or not they think of a contradiction in American policy is another matter.

As far as relations between the people of the U.S. and the people of Vietnam, it is a kind of improvement too. Vietnamese people including those in North Vietnam did welcome Americans, to the point that some say Vietnamese people adopted the American way of life. In the future, relations would improve between the two people, but taking into consideration the difficult relations between the U.S. and China now—there are complex relations. We have problems in terms of the economic situation, human rights, the U.S. watching China and China watching the U.S. This will be the problem of the 21st century. Vietnam is in a very difficult situation right now. Due to kind of ideological relations between the Communist party in Vietnam and the Communist Party in China, it is very difficult for Vietnam to adopt a very anti-Chinese attitude, despite the fact that they know that the threat from Chinese is real. In the South China Sea, and in Vietnam itself—the Chinese come to Vietnam to do business, joint ventures.

Along with the stress of the Chinese border and the South China Sea, there are threats in terms of … economic/political infiltration. Vietnam is in a very difficult position. Many Vietnamese ask whether we have to get along with the Americans. In Vietnam, they say to go with the Chinese you can lose the country but save the Party. Go with the Americans, lose the Party but save the country.

Q: When were you last in Vietnam? What have been the biggest changes in the years since you left, and what has remained the same?

A: I left Vietnam a few days before the collapse [in 1975], and haven’t been back. There still are many members of my family there—by telephone, video, we are in close relations. I didn’t want to come back, not for fear about my security, but they can embarrass me. Either by kissing me—the kiss of death—or by creating difficulties. My sense is that it changed a lot. In terms of economic development. [There has been] a lot of economic development, no more this kind of extreme difficulties that they had at the end of the ‘80s. Like in China, there is a kind of gap between the very rich people and the very poor people. During the war, the international press talked a lot about corruptions in Vietnam, like in China. The future of Vietnam, the development of Internet, Facebook, Twitter, somehow in the future Vietnam will get rid of the communism. I don’t know when. Either they will realize they need to change, or there will be some cataclysmic change. … Somehow in the next 10-15 years Vietnam could [move away from Communism].

Q: You have written that the Vietnamese and the Americans knew very little about each other. As ambassador, how did that affect your work?

A: They’re still the same. I have my view about American policies. I learned a lot—not only through the time I served here, but [later] watching American policies and politics. I used to say to Vietnamese living here that in spite of its openness, to understand American politics is quite complex. There is no secret, but in the interaction of interest groups, the reaction among them, to try to understand American policies, politics. In many cases I did say that the big problem was a lack of understanding.

In getting in contact with American people, with the American political class, the Americans jumped into a very complex situation in Vietnam…. I remember [as ambassador] I was in Air Force One from a meeting in Guam, getting back in Air Force One with President Johnson. On the flight, the staff of the president invited me to go in the inner part of Air Force One to watch a film [possibly a CIA documentary]—about a Chinese explosion. I would assume it had a big influence on President Johnson and his staff because the war in Vietnam was going on. The problem of a Chinese atomic explosion perhaps gave the idea, not to provoke the Chinese into the war. The policy of the U.S. administration then was very careful, people said it was a gift to the North Vietnamese, we are not going to invade your territory….

Q: Could you describe the period surrounding the fall of Saigon in 1975, and how that affected the lives of you and your family?

A: It is very sad. I was lucky because my two daughters were here already going to school. My wife … brought our young son here when I was traveling between Washington and Saigon. When the crisis erupted in April 1975, I was here. I was looking for emergency aid of $700 million. After the fall of Danang, my friends in Saigon asked me to come back. It was very dangerous then, but I couldn’t [resist] the call from friends. Ten days before the final collapse I left Washington to [return to] Saigon. My wife and children were here, concerned about whether I could get out.

[U.S.] Ambassador [to Vietnam] Graham Martin was in Saigon. After I returned [to Saigon] he called me, said to come and see [him]. My home in Saigon was very close to the embassy. He asked me did I see [South Vietnamese] President Thieu yet? No. …. Graham Martin called me a second time and asked me had I seen the president? I said no. He said to tell him the whole truth. In my mind, the whole truth was that the U.S. had given up Vietnam. I never did see [Thieu]. Thieu, with the help of the Americans, flew to Taiwan. Graham Martin told me that if you have difficulties getting out, call me, and I will do my best [to help you]. Two days before [the end], I called Graham Martin, said I had done what I can. He called a Navy plane, and I flew out with my mother, 90 [years old], just two days before the final collapse. By the time I arrived in Bangkok by Navy plane, then a commercial plane to [the United States]. By then the airport in Saigon was bombed by the communists.

Q: What do you see as the legacy of the Vietnam War?

A: It is very difficult to describe in simple terms. As I have written, it is very likely that history will never render a clear verdict about how the U.S. intervened. First, it was a kind of interest if we talk about the presence of [people] who came to North Vietnam to organize clandestine operations against the Chinese. Later on the interest grew into some kind of commitment. First, help to the French when the first Indochina war was happened. It is a commitment already. First, simply an interest, then a commitment, then it grew deeper with the creation of the SEATO treaty. Little by little in 1954 after the Geneva agreement, it was a commitment to help [South Vietnamese leader] Ngo Dinh Diem.

Even the commitment was beginning, but with the Kennedy administration, the commitment grew deeper with advisors. 1963, the coup in Saigon, the assassination of President Kennedy…the commitment [turned] into intervention. After 1963 and the coup against Diem, it was a mess in Saigon. Military, Vietnamese fighting each other, coup, countercoup, North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, Buddhists vs. Catholics, Catholics vs. Buddhists, In view of this situation [and] taking into account the consistent policy of containment against communism in Southeast Asia, the Johnson administration intervened massively, landing Marines in 1965…. I have noticed that in the years after the war ended in ’75--convinced me that the Vietnamese people still have good feelings about America despite that the communist regime had propaganda that Americans were imperialist.

Now people welcome Americans as if nothing is going on. At the same time, there is a feeling among South Vietnamese that Americans didn’t behave well at all at end of the war. After 10 years of war in Afghanistan, the Americans and NATO talk in terms of helping the Afghan people more in the future, for stability. In the case of South Vietnam, the decision of the U.S. Congress was very brutal. In 1975 when I returned to Washington to lobby for aid to South Vietnam, I saw a lot of my American [Senate] friends…They seemed to cut off from the…situation in Vietnam, what could be the future of the people in South Vietnam. Very brutal….Americans continue to think in terms of helping people, while in Vietnam there was an abrupt cutting of everything. There is a lingering feeling among South Vietnamese about this sad situation. [On the other hand,]Vietnamese are very grateful for Americans, to welcome them. More than a million Vietnamese can live in prosperity in this country, due to the generosity of the American people. A lot of people, Vietnamese, come with nothing, and their children are good citizens of this country.

Q: Anything else you’d like to add?

A: I am an old man right now. It’s an open window for friends to look through me to the history of Vietnam. Very optimistic thinking I have, about the future and relations between the American and Vietnamese people. ….The Vietnamese were looking at America through the image of John F. Kennedy. I was very enthusiastic about the inaugural address of John F. Kennedy—a kind of idealism…a willingness of American people to promote democracy. How can anyone not be moved by that?...[Getting back to the legacy of the Vietnam War,] the legacy is something long after the war, and if we look at it long after the war, perhaps we have a more balanced view of the situation.

Interview with Deborah Kalb, co-author of Haunting Legacy.

Bui Diem